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Chapter 6 
With Child: The Meeting of Nature and Culture 
 
 
Birth, and copulation, and death. 
That's all the facts when you come to brass tacks: 
Birth, and copulation, and death. 
I've been born, and once is enough. 
You don't remember, but I remember, 
Once is enough.   
T. S. Eliot Sweeney Agonistes  
My birth is no more an event in my life than my death which is the cessation of my 
world.  Wittgenstein Tractatus 6.431-6.4311.  
If anything, giving birth is more human, because we can choose to avoid it, whereas 
death, eventually, is inevitable.  Virginia Held: "Birth and Death" 1989, 367.  
 
Though the "bare facts" of which Eliot speaks may be universal features of human lives, these 
facts alone tell us virtually nothing about the human condition that would not also be trivially true of 
other animal species.  That is, until we shift perspective from the outsider looking on to the insider 
enmeshed in a web of experience. For birth has a tendency to affect women’s experience so intimately 
and complexly that few are likely to think, even of their own birth so abstractly that it is just an outer 
boundary beyond experience.   
Virginia Held emphasizes how facilely birthgiving has been dismissed as a merely natural event 
lacking the mark of intentional aims and purposes that inform distinctively human events.1  Death has 
been a very rich source of cultural representations--bound up with elaborate imaginative constructions, 
fervent philosophical speculations and extravagant claims to esoteric knowledge and authority.  Birth, by 
contrast, has been a comparatively impoverished concept, particularly in western culture.  Of course, 
                                                            
1 My position here owes much to Virginia Held's insights.  Note particularly her 1989	  paper	  “Birth	  and	  Death.”	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none of us can remember being born, so we can only think about our own births as a time preceding 
conscious awareness.  But when women think about birth from their perspective as mothers or potential 
mothers, a very different understanding of birth surfaces.  Women's own representations of birth have 
seldom figured in literary, artistic or even religious depictions of birth.  With the exception of the theatre 
of the absurd, the few culturally recognized portrayals of birth tended to reflect a disinterested observer's 
perspective.  Even within metaphorical twists on the birth experience, the woman giving birth seldom 
appears.  And within the counterculture of the '60s she remained a passive object, either of others’ 
intervention or natural forces so powerful that her own subjective experience was obliterated. 
Yet the same traditions have imbued death with considerable cultural significance.  In literature 
people often die for causes, yet birth is rarely represented at all and never as an event through which the 
woman giving birth realizes a purpose of her own.  Though virtually all cultures are rich in rituals 
surrounding death, rituals celebrating women's birthgiving are practically nonexistent.2  In fact, those 
ritualistic recreations of birth that do exist, couvade, for instance, disregard the birthgiver altogether, 
transposing the subject of the birth experience from women to men.  According to the last recorded 
practice of this ritual which took place in the Basque country during the 1950's, the father takes to bed 
during the birth of his child simulating the symptoms of labor.  The mother returns to work a soon as 
possible and waits on the father. The transfer of attention to the father is seldom so extreme in modern 
times though the current fashion whereby physicians pressure reticent fathers to participate in labor and 
delivery bears some marks of the former custom.3 
Such widespread indifference to the significance of birthgiving in human experience exemplifies 
cultural neglect of the experiences that give meaning to women's lives.  The events of birth have 
obviously been considered worthy of notice only in the ways they enter men's experience.  Held believes 
that such disdain for women's experience could only have been possible by first denying to women their 
full humanity.  The act of giving birth could not be relegated to the status of a merely "natural" process 
unless the birthgiver were first denied such marks of the fully human as the capacity for choice making, 
conscious experience and imaginative representation. 
Denial of women's humanity is evident also in metaphors distancing reproduction from other 
kinds of purposeful cultural activities.  Pregnant women's bodies are frequently referred to in terms more 
appropriate to the language of machinery, factories and environment.  Medical literature often reduces 
the pregnant woman to the "maternal environment." Emily Martin (1989) discusses in rich detail the 
medical metaphors that shape conceptions of women's bodies.  As she is about to give birth she becomes 
a "laborer" under the direction and control of medical experts.  Her uterus is portrayed as a kind of 
"machine" whose parts function in accord with a blueprint devised by the authorities who "manage" her 
labor and "deliver" the baby.  The physician is cast in the role analogous to the "supervisor" or 
"foreman" of the labor process.  He determines whether the pace of the work corresponds to 
specifications or requires the intervention of drugs or mechanical devices.  Within this scenario the baby 
becomes the "product" produced by the laborer under the supervision of the foreman.  The woman's own 
                                                            
2 Though Margaret Atwood fashions one in The Handmaid's Tale 1986, it is ironically turned to a pronatalist 
purpose that obliterates the individuality of the birthgiver.  
3 For further details about the practice of couvade see the Encyclopedia Britannica. On current practices see “Count 
Me Out of the Hard Labor” by Rick Marin, New York Times, 6/20/04, 9, 1. 
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birthing experience is irrelevant.  Its significance and bearing on the outcome are excluded from the 
process. Like the laborer within industrial capitalism, the birthgiving woman is an object of interest to the 
physician only instrumentally.  If it were possible to generate the product more efficiently by other 
means the laborer could be supplanted. 
Even the early years of human mothering are commonly dismissed as a process that unfolds 
naturally requiring little conscious thought by the mother and only occasional assistance from "experts." 
Held observes that, like the event of birth, the experiences of infancy have also been hidden from men's 
conscious awareness.  Birth and the early upbringing of children are portrayed as a kind of prehuman 
period in the lives of men (1989, 371). So natural has it seemed to relegate women's childbearing and 
early childrearing activities to a realm outside conscious experience that even some feminist writers have 
endorsed the view that childbirth is merely a biological event and the rearing of children belongs to a 
natural realm outside the sphere of distinctively human activities.4   
The 1980s generation of feminists revalued childrearing practices, but very few questioned 
naturalizing conceptions of childbearing. Even comparatively astute observers such as Sara Ruddick 
(1989) claimed that taking care of the growing being within one involves no more than taking care of 
oneself.5  However, women with difficult pregnancies are likely to see beyond this characterization, as 
are women compelled by pregnancy to renegotiate their identities and relationships and restructure their 
life projects and plans. 
A significant factor contributing to cultural perpetuation of the presumption that one’s own birth 
lay outside the bounds of consciousness is discontinuity between sexual intercourse and birth in men's 
experience. In the consciousness of many women, however, sexual intercourse, menstruation, pregnancy 
and birth are all bound together in a continuum that reminds them of their birth-giving capacities. Not 
until comparatively recently with the development of more reliable contraceptive technologies has it 
become possible for women to effectively separate sexual intercourse from pregnancy, either in fact or in 
consciousness. Though various methods of fertility control have been in use throughout history, not until 
hormone suppressing drugs become available in the1980s have contraceptives had the social impact to 
significantly reduce women’s fears that with sexual intercourse they were risking pregnancy. With this 
extended technological capacity has come a rising social awareness of women's perennial attempts to 
intervene in this continuum and recognition that women have not generally resigned themselves to the 
inevitability of this sequence of events but have actively sought to influence their course.  
This awareness has provoked more probing examination of the tendency to relegate this 
continuum to the realm of the natural. For if it were indeed natural, why would there be need for laws 
prohibiting contraception, infanticide, abortion, and infant desertion? Why would traditional literature and 
art have celebrated only the joys and gratifications of mothering, consigning to silence the processes of 
birth and the pain, danger, and risk surrounding birth-giving? What would be the point of perpetuating 
                                                            
4Simone de Beauvoir (1953) and Shulamith Firestone (1970), for instance. 
5More	  recently,	  she	  has	  qualified	  this	  distinction.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  in	  her	  preface	  to	  the	  1995	  edition	  of	  
Maternal	  Thinking,	  she	  points	  to	  some	  of	  the	  deficiencies	  in	  her	  earlier	  conception	  of	  mothering	  as	  "caring	  work"	  and	  acknowledges	  her	  tendency	  to	  slight	  relationships	  of	  the	  birth-­‐giver	  to	  her	  emerging	  child.	   	   LP:	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue,	  see	  Hilde	  Lindemann	  Nelson’s	  1994	  The	  Architect	  and	  the	  Bee:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  Postmortem	  Pregnancy,	  Bioethics,	  8(3):247-­‐67.	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this selective construction if there were no need to bend the minds of women who might not otherwise be 
inclined toward motherhood.6 Dorothy Wertz, for instance points out that: “Selective abortion stands at 
the center of a conflict between women's need to live as full persons in the modern world of work and 
their own moral construction of the world in terms of caring relationships, including relationships with 
unborn babies” (Wertz, 1993, 180). 
So what is new since the 1980s is not so much women's own self-perceptions as agents seeking to 
influence the direction of their own lives, but relaxation of legal prohibitions that had prevented women 
from exercising agency and gaining effective control over their fertility.7 Though there is still 
considerable resistance to recognizing women's authority over their own procreative powers, to use them 
or withhold them, the widespread dissemination of fertility control techniques in the West has contributed 
to increasing public awareness that pregnancy and birth are not merely biological events determined by 
nature but variable processes inevitably subject to human influence and open to conscious choice and 
deliberation.  The increase in women's powers facilitated by contraception has extended further options 
to women, easing the way to a far greater diversity of social roles and occupational choices. 
 
How the Technological Imperative Transforms Pregnancy  
Technological innovation has not only expanded the choice not to become a mother for women 
who opt to remain childless or deliberately limit the number of children, but has also extended options of 
women who wish to bear children but cannot readily realize their aims. For, as we have seen, with 
extended options offered by new conceptive technologies, intensified pressure has been brought on 
women to conform to traditional norms both in the workplace and in domestic life. On the one hand, 
women are pressed to comply with workplace expectations established by and for men accustomed to 
count on the unpaid labor of wives to sustain their domestic lives. On the other, women are still expected 
to distinguish themselves from men in the one respect in which women's biology marks them with a 
distinctive female identity, their capacity to bear children. 
Apprehensions about the extent to which new reproductive technologies are likely to enhance 
women's agency are compounded by the increasing prevalence of other birth technologies, particularly 
                                                            
6 Realization of the powerful influence of social controls in propelling women to have children is not confined 
solely to recent feminists. See, for instance, Leta Hollingsworth’s 1916 paper, "Social Devices for Impelling Women 
to Bear and Rear Children" in the American Journal of Sociology: 22, 19-29.  Hollingworth attributes these social 
controls to the agency of "social guardians," among whom she includes lawmakers, obstetricians, and the press.  
But she also implies that the authority of agents of social control extends to cultural depictions of women which 
glorify the rewards of motherhood and disregard the deficits.  The continuity between her themes and those of 
more recent feminists is unmistakable.  What is new is, first,  sustained effort to bring all of these threads together 
and reinterpret them in light of prevalent methods of social control which are (at least in Western countries) often 
subtle and diffused and, second, systematic attempts to understand how such devices of control fit into more 
inclusive structures that influence gender identity. 
7 I do not mean to suggest that the developers of these technologies deliberately intended to extend women's agency 
but only that they have this effect (among others). Their development has been driven by many social forces, needs 
to free more women for the labor force (at wages that often tend to depress the general wage scale), to reduce the 
birth rate, to extend markets for contraceptive manufacturers, etc. 
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surgical interventions during labor and childbirth (such as caesarean section) and more novel techniques 
that extend obstetrical intervention backward into the antenatal period. Combined together, the two most 
radically innovative kinds of technologies, obstetrical interventions during pregnancy and new conceptive 
techniques, facilitate a radically revolutionary technological future, a future in which pre-conceptive sex 
selection and genetic modification could become readily available.  Pregnancy and childbirth would then 
be subject to human choice in a radically new sense that is liable to intensified political control.  
As these technologies proliferate, cultural attitudes toward birth are shifting. Birth is losing the 
significance it once had as a sharp boundary marking life's beginning. As the fetus comes increasingly to 
be regarded as another patient, pregnant women are finding themselves under increased pressure to 
submit to an increasingly vast array of inter-uterine interventions. Though these new techniques for 
intervening throughout the course of pregnancy purportedly aim to increase the chance of bringing home 
a healthy baby, many wonder whether the harms might not outweigh the benefits—medically, 
psychologically and socially. For just as women have been beginning to insist that physicians recognize 
them as autonomous individuals, medical attention is shifting disproportionately to the moral status of the 
fetus.  The agency of the women on whom its existence depends is again being bypassed. 
Many women with grown children remember a time when pregnancy was comparatively free of 
technical intrusion. When we spoke of the fetus (if we used that term at all) we would pat our bellies, by 
way of reassurance that this growing life tucked away deep within us, in a dark and private place, was 
comfortable and well protected. Standard medical care for women fortunate enough to afford it consisted 
of a monthly visit to the obstetrician. His or her state of the art equipment seldom extended beyond a 
stethoscope to listen to fetal heart sounds, sensitive fingers to probe its dimensions, blood chemistry 
analyses to guard for toxins, vitamins, and creams to assuage anxiety about stretch marks. Bed rest was 
the standard therapy for difficult pregnancies.8 
In marked contrast is the experience of pregnancy among women today. Within the past 
generations a vast armamentarium of new techniques administered by an army of technological experts 
has significantly transformed the experience of pregnancy for women with access to state of the art 
medicine. This change has had profound effects, far beyond its impact on the particular patients subjected 
to these bodily intrusions. New techniques include fetal visualization, laboratory manipulation of 
embryos, and fetal surgery performed either through the pregnant woman's womb or by temporarily 
removing it. Studies have shown that pregnant women are generally enthusiastic, particularly about 
ultrasound scans. "Seeing" the baby on the scan may be the high spot of the pregnancy, an event to be 
shared with the baby's father and siblings.  Women seldom view scans as a threat that might reveal bad 
news, but tend to regard them as benign procedures that allow them to see the baby, confirm its normality 
and, incidentally, learn its sex.  Many women report that this was the first time they felt a bond to the 
fetus. So what some critics see as disruptive to unity between the carrying woman and her fetus, a device 
for constructing the fetus as a separate individual, others see as an event through which a closer 
relationship is established.   Unquestionably, it is a transformative experience.  
The outsider's perspective afforded by visualization, however, can be utilized to ground the 
claims of other parties too. They often have very different agendas and may see the fetus principally as a 
means to promote interests beyond it. The measures an obstetrician may champion to insure a healthy 
                                                            
8 AD notes the need for expansion of this topic, referring to her own pregnancies. 
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outcome may not be compatible with the values of the pregnant woman or her partner. The practice of 
multi-fetal reduction, for instance, may look very different from the pregnant woman's perspective and 
the obstetrician's. The production of knowledge about risk operates within broader power relations. "High 
risk" is an elusive category that has multiple meanings for physician, nurse, social worker and patient. It 
may be used to reinforce unequal power relations between doctors and patient and exacerbate inequalities    
 Fetal imaging techniques have contributed to radical transformation in the public’s thinking about 
pregnancy, transforming traditional symbolic meanings associated with fetal life. However, this 
transformation has not come about through technological change alone. In the U.S. particularly, a 
well-organized anti-abortion lobby has seized on visualization technology to manipulate understandings 
of fetal life. They borrow from the advertising industry techniques of visual representation that stir public 
appetites and manipulate pocketbooks. Consequently, the respective roles of the principal players in the 
drama of pregnancy have undergone considerable transformation. As the fetus has been shifted to center 
stage, physicians' role has moved correspondingly. Not only are they likely to think in terms of their own 
professional reputation but they are under great pressure from political forces beyond themselves to 
"maximize fetal outcome." These changes have contributed further to the reduction of the pregnant 
woman to a "fetal environment." 
The transformation of pregnancy by visualization techniques and fetal monitoring is yet another 
instance of medicine's fascination with technology. I mentioned in a previous chapter Eric Cassell's 
association between this fascination and the development of medical knowledge: first, it reduces the 
problem of illness to the biological problem of disease and then reduces disease to observable "agents," 
such as the tubercle bacillus (for tuberculosis) and atherosclerosis of the coronary vessels (for coronary 
heart disease). Cassell notes (1985) that the results produced by the use of one technology may raise 
questions that only another technology appears able to answer. Through the increasing reliance on such 
visualizable phenomena, the information produced by technology has come to dominate medical practice, 
displacing knowledge acquired through direct interaction with patients and distancing physicians from the 
sufferings of sick people. Technological data support the reigning scientific model that demands 
unambiguous, quantifiable, detached information. Though technology now runs doctors, Cassell adds, 
they are by no means unwilling accomplices since awe of technology (by the public, the media, the law 
courts, etc.) confers increased power on the wielders of these weapons.  According to popular rhetoric, 
they "ferret out and conquer the scourge of disease." Once the technological model of medical 
information has taken root, technology comes to be self-perpetuating and established techniques cling 
tenaciously, even long after they have been shown to be inappropriate. Though Cassell's examples are 
drawn principally from diagnostic technologies, his analysis is applicable to "therapeutic" technologies as 
well. 
 
Legal Issues 
In the U.S. until the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision that legalized abortion, legal recognition of the 
fetus was almost always contingent on subsequent live birth and the aims of law were generally 
supportive of parental interests in rearing children. Since Roe, advocacy on behalf of the fetus has taken a 
new turn.  As we have seen, the fetus is increasingly regarded as an entity possessing rights independent 
of the pregnant woman and often hostile to her interests. This trend is in marked contrast to other areas of 
health care where the dominant judicial trend over the past years has been to expand the scope of patient 
discretion in determining treatment. Courts have generally acknowledged the limits of their capacity to 
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effectively regulate physician-patient relationships and have reserved to patients increasing authority over 
decisions affecting their own wellbeing. In no instances, for instance, has a U.S. court ever forced an 
individual to submit to such invasive procedures for the benefit of another party, even one's own child.  
No mother (or father) has ever been compelled to donate an organ or tissue for a child.  Courts have 
drawn a line between voluntary moral duties and duties mandated by legal dictate.  Since courts respect 
treatment refusal in instances involving organ or tissue donation, where the potential beneficiary is 
indisputably a person, it is particularly noteworthy that pregnant women have been singled out as the only 
group of which such sacrifice is demanded.9 
Behind this mounting preoccupation with the status of the fetus is another agenda. Protection of 
the "rights" of the unborn is seldom the principal concern even of those wishing to force medical 
intervention on pregnant women. Fetal health can be promoted more effectively without summoning the 
judge into the delivery room.10 The qualifications of judges in no way prepare them to weigh the 
technical medical issues involved in these determinations without considerable background in the 
specifics of the case. In 88% of the cases reported in the New England Journal, orders were obtained 
within six hours, sometimes within the course of a single telephone conversation. The pregnant women 
who refused intervention had no opportunity to present their own case, to be represented by counsel, or to 
summon other physicians to speak on their behalf. In such cases circumstances are often complex and 
controversial, far beyond the competence of most judges to evaluate without first hearing and then 
weighing conflicting medical opinion.  In one instance of placenta previa a court order was obtained, but 
before it could be implemented the woman delivered a healthy child without benefit of a C section! 
Noting the irony, the Journal of the Georgia Medical Society captioned its report of this incident: 
"Georgia Supreme Court Orders C Section.  Mother nature reverses on appeal." There have been similar 
happy outcomes in breech cases. Considering the likelihood of disagreement even among physicians 
about indications for cesarean section and growing social controversy about the mounting C section rate 
in the U.S. (currently about 1 in 3) it seems unrealistic to depend on judges "to maximize fetal 
outcome."11   
The traditional practice of relying upon the pregnant woman, herself, to safeguard the wellbeing 
of her fetus is still the most likely way to protect the moral interests of both mother and fetus. When a 
woman has an opportunity to abort early in the pregnancy (a declining option in many areas, particularly 
for young and indigent women), it can be assumed that the woman who does not terminate her pregnancy 
desires the child and seeks its well-being. Of course, no one can ever control all of the circumstances that 
                                                            
9 The case of Angela Carder illustrates one of the most flagrant abuses of a pregnant woman's bodily integrity, 
conveying the view that the state values potential life more highly than actual life. The judge who believed that "the 
state has a compelling interest in protecting potential life" ordered this critically ill cancer patient’s 26 week fetus be 
taken by cesarean section. This intrusion predictably hastened her death (her infant also died following the surgery). 
Forty groups as diverse as the AMA and NOW sought rehearing and eventually won a favorable verdict.  
Commenting on this case the authors of a New England Journal of Medicine article observed that in a society that 
refuses to force the donation of organs or tissues even from cadavers despite their potential benefit to many afflicted 
persons, "we see no good reason that pregnant women should be treated with less respect than corpses" (Lawrence 
Nelson and Nancy Milliken, 2/19/88).   
10 From the title of Nancy Rhoden's article 1986.  11	   See	  CDC	  Fastats,	  at	  http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/delivery.htm.	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will affect a child's future well-being. Also, the pregnant woman needs adequate social support, medical 
services, and encouragement to develop a trusting relationship with a physician or midwife. It is only 
rarely that she alone is in a position to care optimally for herself without these supports. Since they are 
rarely adequate, she should not be held legally accountable for the outcome of her pregnancy. Also, there 
are bound to be instances where women and physician disagree about the urgency of particular obstetrical 
procedures.  However, as has been shown in studies of malpractice, where physicians share knowledge 
with patients and take pains to be understand, physician-patient relationships rarely become adversarial. 
When pregnant women receive good prenatal care, the incidence of emergency obstetrical procedures 
declines sharply.  Before resorting to court ordered obstetrical procedures or punitive legal action, many 
nonintrusive measures can be taken to forestall adverse outcomes and insure a happy experience for both 
mother and child  
There is also another ground for caution in forcing pregnant women to submit to surgical 
interventions. In the New England Journal study cited above, 81% of the women involved in court 
ordered procedures were black, Asian or Hispanic, almost half were unmarried and a fourth did not speak 
English.  Lacking any reliable aggregate statistics it is impossible to know whether or not this represents 
the general population subject to such coerced medical interventions. But it does suggest an additional 
reason for exercising restraint in authorizing such intrusive measures. For clearly these statistics indicate 
discrimination twice over, first by singling women out as the only class that is subject to forced surgical 
interventions for the benefit of another party and second, by imposing this burden disproportionally on 
the most vulnerable women in society.12 
To this point I have cited only some of the most extreme occasions for medical intrusion, 
principally at birth, and all purportedly aimed to benefit the fetus. But in other circumstances, a Tay Sachs 
case, for instance, a judge recommended mandatory abortion. Very few such judicial decisions have been 
subject to the detailed scrutiny of the caesarean section cases publicized in the New England Journal 
article.  Moreover, statistical data on the outcome of such interventions are sparse.  
On closer scrutiny it seems apparent that the locus of the conflict in these cases is not primarily 
between the pregnant woman's desires and fetal interests, but between the perspectives of the pregnant 
woman and her physician. Few women intend harm to their fetus or even foresee it if they deny consent 
for treatment. But from a physician's point of view if a fetal condition goes untreated, handicap to the 
child would be a far greater burden than would treatment on the pregnant woman. So many physicians 
believe they are justified in seeking legal authority to override a woman's refusal to consent to 
intervention. 
Those positioned at the other end of the spectrum see this focus on medical interventions during 
pregnancy as an extension of anti-abortion campaigns. They point out that the relation between pregnant 
women and their fetuses is unique. They constitute a single unit. So the conflict of interest analysis is 
inappropriate.  Concern for health of the fetus is misplaced. Those who hold this position suspect that 
the real interest of people who seek to impose mandatory treatment on pregnant women is to limit their 
life options—to keep them under male control and confine them to the "private" sphere, to their 
traditional role in the home.  
                                                            
12 LP: adding insult to injury, they have the worst access to high quality health care for themselves and their 
families. 
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From the perspective of libertarian legal thinkers, women should be held to reasonable behavior 
toward their fetus taking into account: the likelihood of harm, its severity, the degree of intrusion into the 
woman's body, the offense and risk to the woman affected, disruption in her life plans and the availability 
of less restrictive alternatives. To minimize bias toward intervention, those holding this view tend to 
recommend intervening only on a case by case basis. They propose limiting legal action to tort law and 
object to imposing criminal sanctions. Thus cases could only be brought by the affected parties: child, 
father or physician. 
Medical ethicists who weigh a greater range of physician duties to patients might wonder whether 
this approach would be likely to achieve its intended effect. From this perspective concerns to be 
considered include:13 
• The unequal power of physicians and patient 
• The need to weigh the seriousness of the intrusion and select the least intrusive remedy  
• The fallibility of physicians and limitations on their qualifications to judge conflicting 
pressures on patients, e.g. economic, domestic 
• Difficulty in following physician advice about weight, smoking, rest, sexual abstinence 
etc. 
• Likelihood that the proliferation of legal action would lead some women to avoid medical 
care altogether rather than risk punitive intervention 
• Possible increase in the tendency to play defensive medicine14  
Feminist scholars often question the social context that structures pregnant women's options.  
They point to the paradox in a public policy that punishes pregnant women for conduct during pregnancy 
and narrows their abortion options. They call for redirecting pressures to the medical research 
establishment's quest after an unending array of fetal diagnostic innovations, the commercial enterprises 
that create a market for them, the legal system which drives up malpractice insurance rates, and providers 
who indiscriminatingly push the use of technical innovations. 
  The central fallacy of those who seek to incarcerate pregnant women and foreclose their 
reproductive choices is the assumption that prevention of all harm that might befall a fetus and 
maximization of fetal benefit lies within the pregnant woman's control. Pregnancy, even among the most 
diligent women with the best of medical care, is still risky. First, much criticism of pregnant women's 
conduct betrays a false confidence in the reliability of medical information. Medical opinion fluctuates 
                                                            
13 I am indebted, to Daniel Wikler whose paper provided the model for the "medical ethicist" whose position I 
summarize here.     
14 When the finger is pointed at physicians for the great disparity in caesarean section rates in different localities, 
they often counter with the need to practice defensive medicine in order to avoid malpractice claims.  But when a 
patient asks her physician why he recommends a cesarean section for her, he never cites the fear of malpractice as a 
reason. 
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widely. Hot baths which were once considered soothing and relaxing for pregnant women have become 
taboo. "Excessive" heat during the first trimester is now believed to contribute to neural tube defects.15  
Criticism is dominated by an individualistic bias.16 Intervention in individual cases is unlikely to have 
much impact on infant mortality and morbidity. A public health policy that emphasizes the provision of 
more adequate information and preventive strategies is likely to be far more effective without unfairly 
burdening individual women with unwanted bodily intrusions or prison sentences to protect their fetuses. 
Like a mine disaster or a child is caught in a well, focus tends to become riveted on identified lives. The 
number of statistical lives that would be affected by a preventive policy is ignored. Ignored, too, is the 
importance of supporting pregnant women's confidence in their ability to adequately care for their 
self/fetus. State intrusion is bound to be piecemeal and punitive. In the long run it will lessen likelihood 
that women on the fringes of society will seek prenatal care at all.  
In most instances of conflict the principal parties are the physician and the pregnant woman.  
Characterizing these as instances as maternal-fetal conflict displaces the locus of authority and control.  
Seldom does the pregnant woman have access either to the information or the institutional resources to 
override her physician's authority. Where a case is brought before judicial review (usually initiated by a 
physician or a hospital) the judge's authority supersedes hers. The widespread use of the technique of 
electronic fetal monitoring during labor demonstrates the actual dynamics underlying maternal-fetal 
conflict rhetoric. The technique first came into widespread use in the early 1970s in response to studies 
pointing to a correlation between patterns of fetal heart rate and signs of fetal hypoxia (a condition where 
there is less than normal oxygen in the organs and tissues of the body). Unfortunately, no randomized 
controlled trials were carried out to determine the benefits of fetal monitoring before this form of 
technology became the general standard of care. Subsequent trials have shown that the technique does not 
reduce intrapartum death or any of the other anomalies which its proponents anticipated. Yet it remains a 
standard measure of fetal risk and is relied on to determine when cesarean delivery is warranted.  There 
is consensus now that routine electronic fetal monitoring is the most substantial factor causing the high 
caesarean section rate in the U.S., currently about 30%.17 According to a recent WHO Report, the 
optimal rate for these operations ranges between 10 and 15%.18 
 
Selecting the Sex of Offspring 
Sex selection technologies raise further issues and contribute to the illusion that the outcome of pregnancy 
can be brought wholly under human control. Though feminists frequently raise moral objections to the 
                                                            
15 Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1992.  16	   LP:	  These	  proponents	  of	  incarceration	  also	  apparently	  fail	  to	  consider	  the	  noxious	  health	  conditions	  in	  prisons.	  17	   A	  recent	  study	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  fetal	  monitoring	  does	  not	  improve	  outcomes,	  even	  though	  it	  does	  lead	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  C-­‐Section.	  See	  Health	  Behavior	  News	  Service,	  “Popular	  Fetal	  Monitoring	  Method	  Leads	  to	  More	  C-­‐Sections,	  at	  http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/delivery.htm	  18	   Luz	  Gibbons,	  José	  M.	  Belizán,	  Jeremy	  A.	  Lauer,	  Ana	  P.	  Betrán,	  Mario	  Merialdi	  and	  Fernando	  Althabe,	  “The	  Global	  Numbers	  and	  Costs	  of	  Additionally	  Needed	  and	  Unnecessary	  Caesarean	  Sections	  Performed	  per	  Year:	  Overuse	  as	  a	  Barrier	  to	  Universal	  Coverage,”	  World	  Health	  Report	  (2010)	  Background	  Paper,	  No	  30,	  p.	  3.	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use of these techniques, many are hesitant to condone legal means to limit the use of sex selection since 
they would seriously affect the options of childbearing women.  This issue has become the focus of 
much debate, particularly among feminists. During the 1980s it was conjoined with abortion controversy. 
In recent years with increasing use of prenatal sex selection techniques the emphasis has shifted.  Here I 
consider some key aspects of historic feminist debate and then seek to show why this issue continues to 
be so vexing for feminists.   
        Mary Anne Warren set the stage for formulation of feminist dialogue. She argued that the 
decision to preselect the sex of one's child may often be "motivated by an unselfish desire to ensure that 
the child will have the best possible life" (1985). Julie Zilberberg revisits Warren’s argument and partially 
supports her stance but distinguishes between the situations of women in dissimilar geographical and 
cultural contexts (2004). She points out that sex selection has different meanings in different cultural 
contexts, for poor women in developing countries and affluent women in developed ones.  
Christine Overall (1987) challenged the individualistic assumptions underlying Warren’s 
position, but on another ground.  She questioned the view that sex preselection is a victimless act and 
argued for a broader basis of analysis that is not limited to the production of direct harm or individual 
injustice. Like others including Hilary Rose (1994) she is persuaded that differences between the 
experiences of men and women involve material conditions as well as social constructions. Consequently, 
she believes that preference for a child of a specific sex need not always be sexist.   
Yet the move from preference to action is still troubling. For, in a patriarchal and misogynist 
societies, such a choice is likely to reinforce biases against females. Overall raised another objection to 
sex preselection that seems for her to tip the scales decisively against the practice. She joins sex preselec-
tion to other conceptive technologies--like IVF, embryo transfer and embryo freezing—all of which she 
sees as threats to both the present existence of the fetus and its future well-being. She also classifies as 
harms obstetrical procedures for monitoring and intervening in fetal development--such as amniocentesis, 
ultrasound and fetal surgery. Joining many other feminist authors, she shares the concern that this 
growing array of treatments are evidence of the gradual commodification of reproduction. 
She articulates another concern as well: a link between fetal technologies and apprehensions 
about women's bodies. She suspects that much of the increasing concern about fetal well-being springs 
from a fear that the female body is dangerous and threatening—even to the embryo/fetus, which is 
perceived by the fearful as needing protection, even from its own future mother. Overall (1) opposes 
measures that commodify reproduction, (2) stresses the need to restore the sense of the pregnant woman 
and the fetus as interdependent and interactive, and (3) proposes that the weight of moral obligation to the 
fetus be shifted, from beneficence to nonmaleficence.  That is, in considering medical intervention that 
would affect the fetus, the primary obligation is to avoid harm. The possibility of causing harm should be 
assessed first before undertaking any intervention intended to promote fetal good. So physicians who 
perform abortions are "morally obligated" to cause the least possible harm to the fetus and take all 
reasonable measures to preserve its life that are consistent with carrying out the abortion. 
Something seems seriously lacking in the moral context taken into account here. It presupposes 
that the fetus has independent interests which may conflict with those of the pregnant woman. It also 
appears to rest upon a very narrow conception of what is to count as harm. So Overall takes another step 
that has aroused considerable controversy. She argues that since no one owns the fetus, no one (neither 
the pregnant woman nor the person performing an abortion) has the right to destroy it. But neither does 
the fetus have a right to the use of the woman's body. She readily acknowledges the apparent conflict 
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between these two moral claims but believes it will be resolved once technologies are available for 
gestating the fetus outside the woman's body or transferring it to the uterus of another woman. So she 
recommends laboratory gestation as a viable alternative when a woman opts to terminate her pregnancy 
19  
But to count this as an option perpetuates a view of personal autonomy tied to a kind of territorial 
imagery popular among contract theorists. The appeal to personal autonomy operating here is equivalent 
to a right to control what falls within one's bodily boundaries. The use of property rights language to 
characterize the pregnant woman's relation to the fetus fails to capture the meanings of pregnant 
embodiment and the felt experience common to many pregnant women: that pregnancy reconfigures their 
way of being in the world. Perhaps that is why emphasis on rights language has been far more prevalent 
in the legal struggle for free access to abortion than in feminist abortion discourse which has tended to 
emphasize the significance of abortion within a broader moral framework. 
 
Abortion through a Feminist Lens 
   Feminists often view abortion within a more inclusive set of conditions for realizing women's 
capacities for self-determination and controlling the conditions that shape their lives. Though abortion is 
surely a necessary option for realizing these aims, it is far from sufficient. Many women who seek 
abortions now do so only for lack of other alternatives—adequate income and support services, pregnancy 
leave and competent infant and child care. Many middle class women see abortion as a trade-off; either 
one's fetus or one's career survives but not both. And some are led into abortion by the ideology of the 
nuclear family—that every child "deserves" both a father and a mother. Feminists who understand 
abortion in these ways are likely to see in the development of technologies for maintaining fetal life 
outside women's bodies distrust of women as bearers of children. For, on what ground can we assume that 
laboratory technicians are likely to do a more competent job of gestation than pregnant women? And if 
extrauterine gestation were to become an established practice, would not many women be pressured to 
adopt it—for the good of their baby"? To look to such a technological “fix” as a solution to the moral 
ambiguities involved in abortion only misconceptualizes the real problems and diverts attention from the 
urgent need for social programs: for a workplace structured to meet the demands of women's lives and for 
new patterns of family life that do not depend on advancing patriarchal and capitalistic interests. 
The practice of risking the health or life of pregnant women to save fetal life not only overrides 
the self-determination of adults, but also intensifies that injustice by transforming pregnancy into a 
condition of forced servitude that few women would be willing to risk.20 Surely not only pregnant 
women but all members of society have moral responsibility toward future life--including fetuses. If we 
were serious about meeting this obligation we would clean up the environment and provide more 
adequate nutrition, prenatal care and education to pregnant women. And, we would not stop caring at 
                                                            
19	   Peter	  Singer	  also	  endorses	  such	  a	  future,	  1984.	  LP:	  One	  wonders	  whether	  they	  would	  alter	  their	  positions	  after	  reading	  Coleman’s	  sensitive	  and	  thorough	  consideration	  of	  the	  issue.	  
20 LP: For further exploration of this view, see my “Abortion, forced labor, and war,” in Reproducing Persons. 
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birth: for the sake of both mother and fetus we would establish parental leave provisions and provide 
quality day care as most of the world’s other countries do.21 
Pregnancy beyond “The Bare Facts” 
 In fact, the U.S. is one of just four countries in the entire world that does not mandate some 
amount of paid maternity leave for their citizens.22   
____________________________________________________________________________  
LP: AD clearly intended to add more to this chapter; some of the chapter subheadings suggest that material was 
added instead to later chapters. 
                                                            
21 LP: Not to mention rights to health care, education, and so forth. 	  
22 The other countries Lesotho, Papua New Guinea and Swaziland.  See Public Citizen at robert@citizen.org 
  
